International Broadband Deployment: The Impact of Unbundling by Garcia-Murillo, Martha
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
International Broadband Deployment:
The Impact of Unbundling
Martha Garcia-Murillo
Communications & Strategies
March 2005
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/2442/
MPRA Paper No. 2442, posted 2. April 2007
  
COMMUNICATIONS & STRATEGIES, no. 57, 1st quarter 2005, p. 83. 
International Broadband Deployment: 
The Impact of Unbundling 
Martha GARCIA-MURILLO 
School of Information Studies, Syracuse University 
 
 
Abstract: This paper shows that unbundling an incumbent's infrastructure only results in a 
substantial improvement in broadband deployment for middle-income countries, but not 
for their high income counterparts. Our statistical analysis of approximately 100 countries 
showed that GDP per capita, population, competition and unbundling are all factors that 
can lead a carrier to provide broadband services in a country. The logit models show that 
unbundling has a significant positive impact on the availability of broadband services. The 
OLS analysis indicates that GDP per capita, population size, price, competition, the 
percentage of dial-up Internet users, and hosts all have positive effects on the number of 
subscribers. One implication of these results is that if a policy is to be implemented to 
promote broadband, it should either foster competition through unbundling and/or reduced 
prices. Efforts to develop local content can also improve broadband adoption. 
Key words: broadband, unbundling, competition. 
 
oth broadband and unbundling have been subject to debate among 
policy makers. Increasing content, commercial activity, and services 
provided by governments have prompted policy-makers to design 
policies aimed at promoting broadband. One of the policies commonly used 
to promote broadband is telecommunications unbundling. Its objective is to 
facilitate the entry of new operators in the hope that greater competition will 
oblige carriers to upgrade their infrastructure to provide services such as 
broadband. The policy is nonetheless controversial. Views differ greatly 
about the extent to which governments should attempt to "jump-start" 
competition by requiring incumbent providers to rent their networks as 
unbundled network elements. Academics criticize this because it diminishes 
incumbents' incentives to improve their infrastructure, thus leading to the 
opposite result of the policy's goal. In spite of criticism, many governments 
require carriers to unbundle their networks for entrants perceived to be more 
innovative. 
This study contributes to the debate over broadband and unbundling 
regulatory requirements. It addresses this controversial issue by presenting 
the results from an international empirical analysis. This data set provides 
B
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some useful insights about unbundling and other factors that may affect the 
provision and adoption of broadband. The data set permits us to explore two 
issues: firstly, how unbundling policies affect decisions to offer broadband 
access to the internet and the factors that contribute to the adoption of 
broadband. 
The results of this research can help governments design policies that 
foster the deployment of broadband. In particular, this research finds 
evidence of the positive effects of broadband on the provision of the service, 
although it is not yet clear that prices have dropped to an affordable level for 
the majority of the population. 
The following sections present the factors that other scholars have 
identified as determinants of broadband deployment. The empirical section 
of the paper provides a descriptive analysis of the data and then proceeds 
with logit and OLS regressions. The final part of the paper offers conclusions 
and recommendations for policy makers. 
?  Theoretical context 
This section covers the factors identified in previous works as 
determinants of telecommunications infrastructure investment. Although 
much has been written on this issue, there is little consensus. As we are 
interested in the factors that lead to the provision of broadband by carriers, 
as well as the number of subscribers, the hypotheses presented at the end 
of each section are formulated in terms of these two issues.  
Unbundling policies 
While there is almost universal agreement that markets should be open to 
facilities-based competition, views differ greatly about the extent to which 
governments should attempt to favor new entrants by requiring incumbent 
providers to rent their networks as unbundled network elements1 at low 
prices established by a government regulatory agency. 
                     
1 The term ‘network element’ means facility or equipment used in the provision of a 
telecommunications service. This term also includes features, functions and capabilities that are 
provided by means of such facility or equipment, including subscriber numbers, databases, 
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For example, in a discussion of the impact of the 1996 
Telecommunications Act, CRANDALL (1999) notes that: "… by creating ample 
opportunities for entrants to use incumbents' network facilities, the Act 
discourages investment in new facilities" 2. In addition, JORDE, SIDAK & 
TEECE (2000) further support the argument made by Crandall, stating that 
mandatory unbundling of various network components of an incumbent local 
exchange carrier (ILEC) at TELRIC-based prices discourages ILECs from 
investing in new facilities and services. 
Similar skepticism has been expressed about requiring the provision of 
unbundled network elements in developing and transitional economies. 
Since these countries are busy trying to upgrade and build out their 
infrastructures, it is difficult to coordinate the requirements of the incumbent 
and the entrant wanting to rent a portion of the incumbent's network. 
KESSIDES (2003, p. XII) suggests that the introduction of new services 
requires investments in infrastructure that can be best handled by a vertically 
integrated firm.  
Despite the numerous arguments documented over the comparative 
benefits of policies, a consensus has not emerged regarding what 
constitutes the optimal regulatory policy. A 2001 OECD report stated that 
governments should adopt policies that spur entry because rivalry among 
firms will compel them to innovate. The authors of the paper stated that: 
"[p]olicies such as unbundling local loops and line sharing are key regulatory 
tools available to create the right incentives for new investment in broadband 
access". (p. 4).  
The lack of consensus results from the paucity of empirical studies that 
either validate or belie the analysts' positions. Indeed the D.C. Circuit in 
USTA v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 2002) encouraged the FCC to base 
its decisions on which unbundled network elements need to be available on 
"something a bit more concrete than its belief in the beneficence of the 
widest unbundling possible" 3.  
                     
signaling systems, and information sufficient for billing and collection, or used in the 
transmission, routing, or other provision of a telecommunications service (47 U.S.C. 153). 
2 See also R.W CRANDALL & J.A. HAUSMAN (2000), Competition in US Telecommunications 
Service: Effects of the 1996 Legislation. In S. Peltzman, & C. Winston (Eds.), Deregulation of 
Network Industries: What’s Next, Washington, DC: AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies. 
3 “In the end, then, the entire argument about expanding competition and investment boils down 
to the [Federal Communication] Commission’s expression of its belief that in this area more 
unbundling is better.” 
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Ownership and competition 
Outside of North America, most telephone companies have traditionally 
been owned by the State. Over a period of two decades starting in the late 
1970s many governments began to privatize their state-owned enterprises. 
Ownership issues are of concern in this research because of the potential 
impact that either a privatized or a government-owned company can have on 
the deployment and upgrade of infrastructure. From a theoretical perspective 
it is not easy to predict the impact of privatization on infrastructure 
expansion. There are two possibilities with different potential outcomes. 
When privatization occurs the management structure of the company 
changes and, with it, the organization's objectives. Given the new structure 
of the firm, a privatized carrier will aim to maximize profits. Governments, in 
contrast, aim to maximize the welfare of society (ADAM et al., 1992). Based 
on this rationale one could thus expect government to try to expand the 
infrastructure to serve all sectors of society, while private companies are 
more likely to focus on the most profitable segments, ignoring isolated 
regions and scattered population. When the company moves from state to 
private ownership we would not necessarily expect expansion, although 
upgrades are likely to occur. 
Expansion of infrastructure under state control can happen but there are 
several reasons why this is not observed in practice. Firstly, provision of 
telecommunication services is only one of many government objectives and 
this may not necessarily be a high priority. In the absence of abundant 
resources, governments have to decide where to invest funds. For some 
countries this investment may be in infrastructure, but for others it could be 
in even more basic needs such as water, sanitation, and electricity. 
Furthermore, the state telecommunications operator may have generated 
cash that, instead of being reinvested in the network, is diverted to fund 
other programs. This view was recently expressed by the lead economist 
with the World Bank's Development Research Group, Ioannis Kessides:  
"Few - if any - sustainable improvements in utility performance can be 
achieved simply by replacing a state-owned monopoly with a private 
one" (2003, p. II).  
Therefore the effect on ownership is an issue that policy makers can best 
evaluate through empirical analysis. Investment in telecommunications 
infrastructure has often been a low priority for governments. It is 
consequently unsurprising that research suggests privatization has a 
positive impact on telecommunications infrastructure. In their examination of 
twelve companies, including three telecommunications players, GALAL et al. 
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(1992) find that privatization leads to overall positive welfare effects. Similarly 
RAMAMURTI (1996) finds that in the four years following privatization in 
Argentina, Jamaica, Mexico, and Venezuela, these countries experienced a 
rapid expansion in their networks, averaging 15% growth per year. 
VICKERS & YARROW (1988), in contrast, argue that network expansion 
has multiple components. They find that privatization only exhibits positive 
effects when the market is competitive. In their view a company's efficiency 
is affected by multiple factors. Privatization is only one such factor, and thus 
can only partially explain increased efficiency. In spite of evidence from 
several countries that infrastructure deployment was limited under state 
ownership, one could argue that, in their efforts to provide utilities for the 
population, states have an interest in making a telecommunications 
infrastructure as widely available as possible. Even in areas of the world 
where resources are especially limited, governments may conclude that 
modernization of the telecommunications infrastructure is essential. This 
implies that some governments may succeed in effectively providing 
telecommunications services.  
Although state participation should theoretically have a positive impact on 
infrastructure, previous empirical research indicates that this has not been 
the case. Privatization has generally improved infrastructure deployment and 
modernization. (GALAL et al., 1992; RAMAMURTI, 1996; VICKERS & YARROW, 
1988). We would thus expect privatization to have a positive impact. 
H1: Broadband access is positively related to the full or partial privatization of 
the incumbent carrier. 
Content and broadband 
In the mid-1990s, when deregulation was about to be implemented in 
many places, companies concerned about the impact of emerging 
competition began efforts to expand the spectrum of services. Companies in 
the United States were pioneers in setting up trials to deliver video on 
demand. Similar efforts took place in countries such as Singapore and New 
Zealand. As it turned out, video on demand was not ready to deliver high 
margin revenues and thus telecommunications operators abandoned these 
projects. Cable companies have achieved near video on demand by using 
compression technology. 
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This was nonetheless a prelude to other developments. In the process of 
deregulation and liberalization, carriers realized that they could expand the 
capacity of their networks to offer other services such as data and 
multimedia content distribution. Once it became clear that broadband was a 
feasible alternative, carriers recognized the value of content. Several media 
articles alluded to the need for content to increase demand for broadband. In 
these early days telecommunications carriers began to sign agreements with 
content providers and set up multimedia divisions such as the Bell Atlantic 
Video Services unit or the GTE Interactive Media unit (WILSON, 1994, p. 23).  
In other countries both governments and private sector officials also 
recognized that compelling content would drive demand for broadband. In 
2000 the director of the Cable and Satellite Broadcasting Association of Asia 
(CASBAA) stated that as broadband began to emerge in that region, if there 
were no substantial value added in the form of more specialized applications 
as well as entertaining content, users would not be willing to pay for high-
speed connections (WILHELM & BICKERS, 2000, p. 35). In Taiwan, a survey 
by the Ministry of Transportation and Communication found that internet 
users in the country were dissatisfied with the amount of content available 
on government sites (CHANG, 1999). In the United States representative 
Mike HONDA of California stated that users need to find internet content and 
applications compelling enough to make them pay for these services 
(HONDA, 2002, p. 14) 4. 
An additional inhibitor to the expansion of broadband networks is the 
price that some internet service providers pay U.S. companies. The 
disproportionate amount of content stored at sites in the United States 
compared to other countries results in asymmetric traffic flow. Since this 
traffic has to be routed through backbones that are, for the most part, owned 
by U.S. carriers, ISPs in other countries have to pay for such connections. In 
Australia the National Bandwidth Inquiry Report (TERRY, 1999) calculated 
that connection costs were between USD 133 million and USD 177 million 
per year higher than the report thought that they should be. Such high 
connection charges for the internet backbone are increasing prices for users 
in those countries, thus inhibiting adoption. Local content is consequently an 
element that could minimize the amount of payments to foreign carriers. 
                     
4 To the best of our knowledge, there is no academic research that articulates the relationship 
between content availability and demand for broadband. As noted above, the press has 
reported on industry and government concerns related to the need for content to stimulate 
broadband demand. 
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One of the concerns in this analysis is the direction of causality. In the 
relationship between content and broadband infrastructure there is 
potentially bidirectional causality. Without content, broadband cannot take 
off, but at the same time, if people are not willing to pay for this service, 
there is no incentive to develop content. Optimism during the dot-com 
bubble led to large investments in telecommunications infrastructure, which 
has resulted in unused capacity, but perhaps only in the USA. Broadband 
arguably now needs content. We hypothesize a positive relationship 
between domestic content and broadband adoption 
H2: Broadband access/subscription is positively related to the availability of 
domestic content. 
Other variables 
There are several other factors that determine the level of broadband 
subscription. Disposable income is a key determinant of a person's decision 
to purchase goods or services. It is not surprising to see that almost 60% of 
the countries that reported having broadband subscribers are in the high-
income category. Income is related to price. In addition to monthly fees, 
users have to pay connection and equipment charges. Price thus can be a 
major barrier to adoption of the technology in the poorer regions of the world. 
We will test the following hypothesis: 
H3: Higher income levels have a positive impact on broadband 
access/subscription. 
Population density is another variable that affects technology adoption. 
Regions with high population density can be served more cheaply. More 
sparsely populated areas could only be served at higher prices. We will thus 
test the following hypothesis: 
H4: Higher population density has a positive impact on broadband 
access/subscription.  
The education level of the population is also included in the model. 
People with higher education should be more familiar and comfortable with 
using information technology. They may also be interested in having access 
to more information from the internet. We will thus test the following 
hypothesis. 
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H5: Higher average levels of education have a positive impact on broadband 
access/subscription.  
Other technological aspects of importance are the availability of personal 
computers and the number of people with internet access. Whether using 
broadband or narrowband, personal computers are the most common 
method of accessing the internet. It follows that the higher the number of 
computers in a country, the higher the probability that its inhabitants are 
connected to the internet. Similarly, internet access, even using dial-up, can 
be a factor that leads to the adoption of broadband. A person familiar with 
the internet could, over time, receive greater value from the resource and 
may consider switching to a faster connection. We will thus test the following 
hypothesis:  
H6: Higher penetration of personal computers has a positive impact on 
broadband access/subscription.  
H7: Higher use of dial-up internet has a positive impact on broadband 
access/subscription. 
Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the relationship between these variables and the 
number of broadband subscribers. 
Figure 1 – Relationship between GDP per capita and subscribers to broadband 
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Figure 2 - Relationship between percentage of personal computers  
and subscribers to broadband 
Lowess smoother, bandwidth = .9
lperpc
2 4.05494
2 2.5 3 3.5 4
-1.88189
2.79723
BRA
ARG
HUN
CHL
EST
BEL
FRA
JPN
TWN
DEU
FIN
ISL
CAN
KOR
DNK
 
Figure 3 - Relationship between percentage of internet users  
and subscribers to broadband 
Lowess smoother, bandwidth = .9
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Figure 4 - Relationship between percentage of internet hosts  
and subscribers to broadband 
Lowess smoother, bandwidth = .9
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?  Data analysis and methodology 
The purpose of this study is to determine the factors that affect 
broadband access and the number of subscribers. This section is divided 
into three subsections. The first part includes a description of the variables 
used in the data analysis as well as a detailed description of the price 
variable calculation. The second part presents initial findings from 
descriptive statistics, while the third section examines the results of the logit 
and OLS regression analysis. 
Data 
The database used for this study covers approximately 100 countries, but 
the number of countries varies depending on the model because some 
variables have missing data. Only the year 2001 is included because it is the 
only data currently collected on broadband. The data used in this study 
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comes from several databases. The ownership and competition variables 
come from the ITU Trends in Telecommunications Reform 2002 report. 
Unbundling data comes from the ITU regulatory database. 
Prices for broadband were obtained from carriers' websites and OECD 
documents. The variables internet users, content, and personal computers 
were obtained from the ITU World Telecommunications Database. The 
variables population density, income, and education are from the World 
Bank's World Development Indicators 2002.  
Table 1 - Description of variables 
Variable Description Expected sign 
Unbundling Dummy: unbundling required by government + 
Ownership Dummies: privatized, state-owned, semi-privatized + (with 
privatization) 
Competition Dummies: monopoly, duopoly, partial competition, 
full competition 
+ (with higher 
competition) 
Population density Number of people per square KM + 
Income GDP per capita + 
Prices Monthly price per MB - (with higher 
prices) 
Education Illiteracy rate / average education level of the 
population in years 
+ 
Content Number of domain name servers registered + 
Personal 
computers 
Number of PCs in the country + 
Internet access Percent of people that have access to the Internet 
not broadband 
+ 
Broadband 
Access 
Percent of population with broadband access Dependent 
variable 
The price variable was constructed on a price per megabyte (MB) basis 
because different carriers offered multiple options for capacity and speed. 
We selected the 512 kbps download stream speed because it is the most 
common alternative for DSL users around the world. That speed is 
comparable to cable connections. Based on HORRIGAN (2002), we assume 
that the typical subscriber to flat-rate service is online for 50 hours per 
month. The number of megabytes downloaded per hour is between 5 and 10 
MB for average web surfing. With this information we calculated that a 
broadband user would need approximately 500 MB per month and thus 
decided that a typical two person household would require 1,000 MB per 
month 5. We use this information to calculate the price per megabyte of 
                     
5 This is an assumption because there are no available statistics on the average number of 
household members using broadband. We decided to use 10MB, the higher number of MB, 
because average browsing does not include streaming media, which is an important broadband 
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those households whose broadband provider offers unlimited downloads. 
For those countries where the carriers have limits, we used the limit imposed 
to calculate the price per megabyte.  
Table 1 identifies the variables included in the model, and the effect we 
expect them to have on both the dependent variables of access to 
broadband services and number of subscribers. 
Descriptive results 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the variables of interest. Income 
levels and the availability of technology are highly correlated with broadband 
subscriptions. After adjustment for population size, differences between low 
and high-income countries are highly pronounced. The number of computers 
in the country is less than 2% in poor countries, while almost 40% of the 
population has access to computers in high-income countries. Upper middle 
income countries have 10 times as many internet users as low income ones. 
In high income countries this figure is 30 times higher.  
Table 2 - Descriptive statistics with means and standard deviations 
Variable Low income Lower-middle income 
Upper-middle 
income High-income 
GDP per capita/PPP 1782.316 (1937.77) 
4906.024 
(1557.69) 
9552.607 
(2995.18) 
24391.03 
(6439.88) 
Population density 96.03743 (145.79) 
101.8773 
(147.68) 
166.6773 
(254.10) 
349.4403 
(1086.72) 
Illiteracy rate 37.553 (21.61) 
15.729 
(12.44) 
9.277 
(8.26) 
7.750 
(6.71) 
Residential monthly 
telephone subscription 
4.046 
(1.47) 
4.238 
(3.08) 
6.856 
(4.62) 
12.459 
(4.16) 
% of PCs in the country 1.507 (1.52) 
3.761 
(3.49) 
13.229 
(5.11) 
36.901 
(13.44) 
% of Internet users 1.136 (1.26) 
4.041 
(2.32) 
12.510 
(9.15) 
37.565 
(13.69) 
% of hosts in the country 0.023 
(0.04) 
1.054 
(4.01) 
1.404 
(1.26) 
6.162 
(7.03) 
% of the population with 
broadband 
0.005 
(0.001) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.253 
(0.36) 
2.736 
(3.47) 
A similar pattern is observed in the production of internet content, which 
we operationalized as the number of hosts registered for the country. Finally, 
                     
application. HORRIGAN (2003) calculates that about one in every five people used streaming 
media with their broadband connections. 
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descriptive statistics suggest that the deployment of broadband networks is 
still quite limited throughout the world. The majority of broadband 
subscribers are located in high-income countries. 
Table 3 shows access to broadband and the privatization status of the 
carrier. In those countries where broadband was available in 2001, almost 
50% of the carriers were privatized. In countries where no broadband was 
available, 76% of the carriers were state-owned. A significant χ2 also 
indicates that the relationship between the ownership status of the carrier 
and the availability of broadband connections is not by chance. Perhaps 
because of their lack of resources, state carriers seem to be unable to 
upgrade their networks to provide these services.  
Table 3 - Summary tabulation: relationship between broadband access  
and ownership of the incumbent carrier 
 
Carrier ownership 
 State Privarized 
Broadband Not Available 76.12 23.88 
Available 54.76 45.24 
Pearson chi2(1) = 7.0874 Pr = 0.008 
As far as market conditions and prices are concerned, table 4 provides a 
summary of the level of competition in countries where broadband is 
available and those where it is not. 66% of the countries that do not have 
broadband services also have single carriers providing local telephony 
services, while 73% of countries in which services are available have a 
competitive local market. Because we have a significant χ2, we can thus 
conclude that this relationship is not accidental. After calculating the odds 
ratio, it emerges that the likelihood of having access to broadband is 24 
times greater in countries with competitive local markets.  
Table 4 - Summary tabulation: Broadband competition prices  
and subscribers in countries with broadband (means and standard deviations) 
Variable Monopoly Partial competition Full competition 
Price (cents) 0.010 (0.01) 
0.006 
(0.004) 
0.0076 
(0.005) 
% of the population with 
broadband 
1.293 
(2.28) 
1.365 
(1.74) 
2.359 
(2.72) 
Pearson chi2(1) = 21.9147 Pr = 0.000 
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In doing this simple analysis we have to take into consideration that other 
factors may also lead to competition. It could be the case, for example, that 
competition exists in larger and wealthier markets. What appears to be a 
relationship between competition and access to broadband may actually 
represent the income level of the population. The regression analysis in the 
next section will help to elucidate these relationships more clearly. 
The price for broadband varies from slightly more than half a cent per 
megabyte downloaded in Belgium to 21 cents per megabyte in Turkey. 
Table 5 shows the average prices and percentage of the population using 
broadband service for countries with different levels of competition. The 
percentage of broadband subscribers is slightly higher in those countries 
that experience competition in the provision of this service. As the 
differences are so small, it is difficult to determine if they are significant at 
this point. 
The impact of unbundling requirements on the availability of broadband 
services is an issue facing regulators. Many have been concerned about the 
impact that lack of unbundling will have on the level of competition in the 
market. Because infrastructure deployment is expensive, there are few 
carriers with the resources to replicate these networks. The introduction of 
wireless technologies such as microwave, satellite, and WiFi are making 
these investments more feasible. The local loop nonetheless is mostly wired 
and, in this study, broadband access is defined as being provided through 
wired means. Both the cable and the telephone infrastructure that is 
necessary for broadband services mainly belong to incumbent carriers. As a 
result of the dominant position held by these companies, their brand 
recognition and control over essential facilities, a lack of unbundling 
requirements could potentially impair the number of entrants and impede the 
deployment of these networks at reasonable prices.  
Table 5 - Unbundling requirements for countries with  
and without access to broadband services 
 No unbundling required Unbundling required 
No broadband access 75.86 24.14 
Broadband access 32.5 67.5 
Pearson chi2(1) = 21.9147 Pr = 0.000 
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Table 6 presents the percentage of carriers required to unbundle in 
countries with and without broadband services. The table shows that 76% of 
countries that don't require their carriers to unbundle also do not have 
broadband access, while 67% of countries with broadband services require 
unbundling. Here again the χ2 is significant. 
Regression models 
The descriptive analysis section has provided some insights about the 
factors that can affect the access and deployment of broadband networks. 
Per capita income, privatization of the incumbent carrier, market conditions 
such as level of competition, and regulatory factors such as unbundling 
seem to influence the availability of broadband. In this section we present 
the results of two statistical analyses. The goal of the first analysis is to 
determine the factors that affect the availability of broadband services in a 
country. This analysis uses a logit regression. The second set of models 
uses an OLS regression analysis that shows the factors influencing the 
number of broadband subscribers. 
Logit regression analysis 
We ran a logit and standard regression to determine the factors that 
contribute to the deployment of broadband. The purpose of the first logit 
regression is to see whether market conditions and government actions 
affect the availability of broadband independently of the number of people 
subscribing to the service. This regression is important because broadband 
services are relatively new and not available in many countries.  
Where a service is available, there is still a relatively small number of 
subscribers. The dependent variable in these models is coded as 1 if there 
are broadband services in the country and 0 if there are not. We fitted three 
models. The first two include only market variables, while the third model 
includes regulatory variables to determine whether public intervention is 
necessary to make such services available.  
The logit equation is:  
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Table 6 - Robust logit regression models of broadband availability (market variables) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
GDP per capita 
169.529** 
(-355.57) 
47.683*** 
(-64.269) 
193.426*** 
(-348.949) 
Population 
13.695*** 
(-7.474) 
2.667*** 
(-0.929) 
12.316*** 
(-6.379) 
Percentage of Internet 
users 
6.022 
(-10.872) 
1.315 
(-0.768) 
10.332* 
(-14.571) 
Illiteracy rate 
1.482 
(-0.717)   
Broadband competition  
6.857** 
(-6.506)  
Privatization   
0.828 
(-2.037) 
Unbundling   
34.545*** 
(-47.062) 
Observations 61 92 72 
Pseudo R2 .831 .824 .903 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Robust standard errors in 
parentheses 
Table 7 shows the results of the logit regressions. These three models 
help identify the factors contributing to the availability of services in the 
country. The variables corresponding to the percentage of personal 
computers, percentage of dial-up internet users and percentage of internet 
hosts are highly correlated and thus cannot all be included in a single model. 
Of those three variables, we decided to include only internet users because 
this implicitly includes the number of computers. We also expected that dial-
up internet users would be likely to switch to broadband. 
The three models provide some evidence in favor of and against the 
hypotheses outlined for this paper. We hypothesized that the effect of all 
variables except illiteracy would be positive. For all of the models fitted, we 
find that both the population size and the per capita income positively affect 
the probability of a country having access to broadband services, which is 
consistent with what we had hypothesized. The first model suggests that the 
illiteracy rate and the percentage of Internet users have not had an effect on 
the availability of broadband services in the country. We had hypothesized 
that illiteracy would have a negative effect and dial-up Internet users a 
positive effect. These two hypotheses are thus not supported. 
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 We eliminated the illiteracy rate from the second regression because of 
its lack of significance, but left the internet users variable because it was 
significant at the 15% level. We also added the number of broadband 
providers. This second model suggests, as one would expect, that 
competition among broadband providers positively affects the probability of 
service availability. Once again, the level of internet usage was not 
significant. 
The third logit regression includes policy related variables: privatization of 
the incumbent carrier and unbundling. We find that the variable privatization 
is not significant and is therefore unrelated to the availability of broadband 
services. The variable "unbundling" was highly significant. 
From the logit regression results we calculated the probabilities for each 
of the country income levels with and without an unbundling policy. We are 
interested in the effect of unbundling on the probability of broadband 
services being offered in the country. The table shows that country income 
level has a substantial impact on the probability of having access to 
broadband services. This is not surprising, as these services remain a luxury 
for most people in developing nations. The other significant result from these 
calculations is the effect of unbundling. For low income countries, 
unbundling shows hardly any impact, but for middle income countries an 
unbundling policy increases the probability of having access to this service 
from 2% to 41%. High income countries are not affected as drastically. It is 
possible that in high income countries the market is sufficiently attractive for 
companies to offer such services, even if unbundling is not required. This is 
in itself an interesting result, as a country such as South Korea is able to 
reach high broadband penetration even though carriers have has not 
implemented local loop unbundling (KELLY, GRAY & MINGES, 2003, pp. 12 and 
64). The South Korean case has led some people to believe that unbundling 
is not necessary, but this may not apply to less developed countries. 
Table 7 - Probability of broadband services being provided 
 
Unbundling 
required 
No unbundling 
required 
Low income 0.0029 0.0001 
Lower middle income 0.4163 0.0202 
Higher middle income 0.9413 0.3172 
High income 0.9989 0.9637 
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OLS regression analysis 
The dependent variable for these OLS regression models is the 
percentage of internet users in the country that subscribe to a broadband 
service. The variable "price" was also added. The difference between these 
results and those of logit regression results is that in logit analysis we are 
only concerned with the factors that affect availability of broadband services 
in the country. In the regression analysis we want to determine the effect 
that each factor has on the actual number of subscribers. 
We fitted three models and the only difference among them is that the 
first two include the total population variables, while the third incorporates 
population density instead. The second of the first two regressions includes 
the variable lpop_15. This is because we identified a break in the data at 
point 15 when we plotted the log of the population and broadband 
subscribers. The OLS regression models include the following variables: 
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We find that GDP per capita is not significant in any of the three models. 
While this is not what we hypothesized, it is consistent with the data. The 
majority of the countries that have broadband are high income. We find that 
its provision is related to income, but the level of subscribership is not.  
Population and population density are both significant. This is consistent 
with what we hypothesized and it is also intuitively consistent with 
experiences in some countries. Countries that have bigger populations are 
more likely to have more subscribers, even if the percentage of subscribers 
is the same. Similarly, more densely populated areas may enjoy a higher 
rate of broadband subscription either due to lower prices in those areas or a 
contagion effect. If a city is densely populated, broadband users are more 
likely to influence their neighbors to get broadband too. Population density in 
this case may not necessarily reflect infrastructure upgrading, but rather 
diffusion. The variable "price" is significant although it has a positive 
connotation, i.e. the higher the price, the higher the number of subscribers. 
This is a counterintuitive result, but it is possible that while per byte and time-
based pricing make these services expensive in some countries, people are 
still adopting. 
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Table 8 - Robust logit regression models of broadband availability 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Log GDP per capita 0.525 (-0.37) 
0.453 
(-0.289) 
0.69 
(-0.385) 
Population 0.351** (-0.108) 
0.190** 
(-0.073)  
Price 9.920* (-4.755) 
10.320** 
(-3.508) 
12.060* 
(-5.826) 
Competition of broadband 
providers 
2.847*** 
(-0.606) 
2.999*** 
(-0.697) 
1.941*** 
(-0.327) 
Log Percentage of Internet 
Hosts 
1.809*** 
(-0.393) 
1.996*** 
(-0.456) 
1.404*** 
(-0.311) 
Percentage of Internet Hosts 
Squared 
-0.472*** 
(-0.091) 
-0.519*** 
(-0.096) 
-0.395*** 
(-0.085) 
Percentage of Internet users 1.102** (-0.407) 
1.049* 
(-0.457) 
1.191*** 
(-0.337) 
Privatization -0.375 (-0.214) 
-0.405 
(-0.234) 
-0.168 
(-0.189) 
Unbundling 0.457 (-0.333) 
0.338 
(-0.31) 
0.516** 
(-0.188) 
lpopt_15  0.272 (-0.177)  
Population density   0.262*** (-0.076) 
Constant -19.225*** (-2.883) 
-16.239*** 
(-2.757) 
-15.930*** 
(-3.033) 
Observations 18 18 18 
R-squared 0.97 0.98 0.98 
Robust standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%;  
*** significant at 1% 
The number of broadband providers in the country, which measures the 
level of competition, is significant. This can be interpreted as greater 
willingness to subscribe, potentially as a result of increased choice that 
enables selection of a plan best suited to subscriber needs.  
The percentage of domestic internet hosts also appears to positively 
contribute to the broadband subscriber base. There is consequently a 
positive relationship between local content available to the population in their 
own language and the number of people that contract broadband services. 
The percentage of internet users is also significant and consistent with 
our initial hypothesis. This is also unsurprising because a subscriber that 
accesses the internet with a dial-up connection is likely to consider switching 
to broadband if available. 
The policy related variables included in the model are privatization and 
unbundling. We find that privatization is not significant. State-owned 
monopolies, whose relationship with the dependent variable is captured in 
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the constant term, have a significant and negative relationship with 
broadband demand. State monopolies that provide broadband services are 
possibly not as attractive as those provided by private carriers in a 
competitive environment. 
Unbundling, the variable of greatest interest in this study, is not 
significant in two of the OLS models. Only when population density is 
included in the model is unbundling significant with the expected sign. This 
means that an unbundling policy does not necessarily correlate with the 
number of subscribers. From the logit regression we know that unbundling 
has a positive influence over whether broadband services are made 
available in a country. 
It is important to note some of the limitations of this study. International 
statistical analysis has several weaknesses. Only data aggregated at a 
national level is available, making it impossible to identify internal differences 
within countries. It is likely, for example, that people in countries with 
greatest broadband infrastructure live mostly in the largest cities. We do not 
have data about the level of competition in different regions and differing 
regulatory regimes within countries. We are thus unable to determine more 
specific features of the population that could be helpful for policy. This study, 
however, is appropriate for policy at a more general level. 
?  Conclusion and policy recommendations 
It is clear that income is an important determinant of infrastructure in 
general, but much more so for broadband. There are several reasons why 
broadband is more likely to be available in high-income than low income 
countries. Firstly, the price of a computer as a percentage of income is 
smaller. Similarly, broadband is a value added service and its price, 
especially in the early years of rollout, tends to be high. High-income 
economies are also more likely to have greater content available to the 
population because of the greater availability of resources such as software 
required to produce materials for the internet. In addition to income, 
population size also contributes to the likelihood of having broadband 
services provided in the country.  
Of the factors that governments can control, competition and unbundling 
show a positive relationship to the availability of the service. We also find 
that the relationship between unbundling and access to broadband services 
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is more pronounced among middle-income countries. This means that 
governments in less developed countries can promote the deployment of 
broadband networks by both fostering competition and requiring unbundling 
of local loops. Unbundling will allow other carriers to enter the market and 
pressure from competition should force them to provide advanced services. 
The OLS regression results are consistent with the hypotheses 
formulated for this study. They show that competition positively affects the 
number of subscribers. Price also shows a positive relationship, although the 
opposite was expected. In the early years of the technology richer users may 
contract the service, even at high prices. Due to the high price of the service, 
it is likely that large segments of the population in less developed countries 
will not be able to afford it. Governments should thus aim to find 
mechanisms that allow the general population to have broadband access to 
the internet. Some solutions have been implemented using community 
centers. Local content could also be produced in these settings. The 
regression results also show that having national content also positively 
affects broadband subscriptions. The number of dial-up users is another 
factor that positively influences the demand for the service. From a policy 
perspective, regulations that foster competition, including unbundling, can 
lead to price reductions that further boost the number of dial-up, and 
subsequently of broadband subscribers.  
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